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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
In the Matter of Cooper C. Lynn, Respondent 
Appellate Case Nos. 2019-001398 and 2019-001399 
ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel asks this Court to place Respondent on interim 
suspension pursuant to Rule 17(b), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR.  The petition also 
seeks appointment of an attorney to protect the interests of Respondent's clients 
pursuant to Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR. 
IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's license to practice law in this state is 
suspended until further order of this Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, is hereby 
appointed to assume responsibility for Respondent's client files, trust account(s), 
escrow account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office accounts 
Respondent may maintain. Mr. Lumpkin shall take action as required by Rule 31, 
RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, to protect the interests of Respondent's clients.  Mr. 
Lumpkin may make disbursements from Respondent's trust account(s), escrow 
account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office accounts Respondent 
may maintain that are necessary to effectuate this appointment. 
This Order, when served on any bank or other financial institution maintaining 
trust, escrow and/or operating account(s) of Respondent, shall serve as an 
injunction to prevent Respondent from making withdrawals from the account(s) 
and shall further serve as notice to the bank or other financial institution that Peyre 
Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, has been duly appointed by this Court. 
Finally, this Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, 
shall serve as notice that Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, has been duly 
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appointed by this Court and has the authority to receive Respondent's mail and the 
authority to direct that Respondent's mail be delivered to Mr. Lumpkin's office. 
Mr. Lumpkin's appointment shall be for a period of no longer than nine months, 
unless an extension of the period of appointment is requested. 
                  s/Donald W. Beatty               C.J. 
FOR THE COURT 
Columbia, South Carolina 
August 23, 2019 
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Pursuant to the provisions of Article V, Section 4 of the South Carolina 
Constitution, 
IT IS ORDERED that the Pilot Program for the Electronic Filing (E-Filing) of 
documents in the Court of Common Pleas, which was established by Order dated 
December 1, 2015, is expanded to include Charleston County.  Effective 
September 18, 2019, all filings in all common pleas cases commenced or pending 
in Charleston County must be E-Filed if the party is represented by an attorney, 
unless the type of case or the type of filing is excluded from the Pilot Program.  
The counties currently designated for mandatory E-Filing are as follows:   
Abbeville Aiken  Allendale  Anderson 
Bamberg  Barnwell Beaufort  Berkeley 
Calhoun Cherokee  Chester Chesterfield  
Clarendon Colleton  Darlington Dillon 
Dorchester Edgefield Fairfield  Florence 
Georgetown Greenville Greenwood Hampton 
Horry Jasper Kershaw Lancaster 
Laurens Lee Lexington Marion 
Marlboro McCormick Newberry Oconee 
Orangeburg Pickens Richland Saluda 
Spartanburg Sumter Union Williamsburg 
York Charleston-Effective September 18, 2019 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
Re: Expansion of Electronic Filing Pilot Program - Court 
of Common Pleas 
Appellate Case No. 2015-002439 
ORDER 
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Attorneys should refer to the South Carolina Electronic Filing Policies and 
Guidelines, which were adopted by the Supreme Court on October 28, 2015, and 
the training materials available on the E-Filing Portal page at 
http://www.sccourts.org/efiling/ to determine whether any specific filings are 
exempted from the requirement that they be E-Filed.  Attorneys who have cases 
pending in Pilot Counties are strongly encouraged to review, and to instruct their 
staff to review, the training materials available on the E-Filing Portal page.  
s/Donald W. Beatty 
Donald W. Beatty 
Chief Justice of South Carolina 
Columbia, South Carolina 
August 28, 2019 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
In The Court of Appeals 
A.O. Smith Corporation, Appellant, 
v. 
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental 
Control and Town of McBee, Respondents. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-002108 
Appeal From The Administrative Law Court 
Shirley C. Robinson, Administrative Law Judge 
Opinion No. 5682 
Heard March 14, 2019 – Filed August 28, 2019 
 AFFIRMED 
W. Thomas Lavender, Jr. and Joan Wash Hartley, both of 
Nexsen Pruet, LLC, of Columbia, for Appellant. 
Martin S. Driggers, Jr., of Sweeny Wingate & Barrow, 
PA, of Hartsville; Richard Edward Mclawhorn, Jr., of 
Sweeny Wingate & Barrow, PA, of Columbia; Kathryn 
Susan Mansfield, of Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, 
of Charleston; and Matthew Todd Carroll and Belton 
Townsend Zeigler, both of Womble Bond Dickinson 
(US) LLP, of Columbia, all for Respondent Town of 
McBee. 
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Stephen Philip Hightower, of Columbia, for Respondent 
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental 
Control. 
KONDUROS, J.: A.O. Smith Corporation appeals the dismissal of its contested 
case regarding the Town of McBee's (the Town) operation of the Town's wells, 
arguing the administrative law court (ALC) erred in finding final approvals are not 
staff decisions subject to appeal under section 44-1-60 of the South Carolina Code 
(2018 & Supp. 2018) because the South Carolina Department of Health and 
Environmental Control (DHEC) had a legal duty to issue the final approvals and 
the applicable regulation does not provide for conditional approvals.  We affirm.   
FACTS 
A.O. Smith owns a water heater and boiler manufacturing facility in Chesterfield 
County outside of the Town's city limits. According to the facility's Director of 
Operations, Jeff Barron, the facility needs an adequate and dependable water 
supply to operate. In addition to the water used in the manufacturing and testing 
process, the facility's insurance carrier requires a minimum instant flow of water 
for its fire protection system. In 1979, the Town and A.O. Smith agreed the Town 
would provide A.O. Smith with "a reasonable supply of water."1 A.O. Smith 
comprises about sixty percent of the Town's water revenue. 
The Town's water system is made up of two wells (Well No. 1 and Well No. 2).  
From 1995 to 1999, the Town's water system received three consecutive 
"unsatisfactory" ratings results from DHEC sanitary surveys "due to a lack of 
quantity to meet the system's customers' needs, wellhead security issues[,] and 
distribution system shortcomings." In 1999, the Town and Alligator Rural Water 
& Sewer Company, Inc. (Alligator Water) entered into a forty-year agreement for 
Alligator Water to supply the Town's water. The Town stopped operating both of 
its wells at that time. According to the Town's engineer, Alligator Water took over 
operation of the Town's entire water system and had DHEC transfer the Town's 
1 They also agreed the Town would not annex into the Town limits prior to 
October 1, 2009, A.O. Smith's real property on which its facility is located and the 
Town's fire prevention and rescue services would respond to the facility when 
needed. 
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operating permits to it. DHEC discontinued the Town's operational permit for its 
supply wells and entire water system and transferred them to Alligator Water. 
The Town received a $4.5 million loan in 2005 from the United States Department 
of Agriculture. According to the Town's mayor, John Campolong, the Town used 
the loan to refurbish its water system. Campolong also indicated the Town became 
aware of information that led it to believe Alligator's financial situation was 
precarious and decided it no longer wished Alligator Water to be its sole source of 
water. Alligator Water placed the Town's Well No. 1 offline in 2009 due to 
contaminants in routine water sampling. 
On December 7, 2010, the Town submitted a Preliminary Engineering Report 
(PER) to DHEC. Alligator Water received a copy of a draft operating permit for 
the Town and contacted DHEC "to offer several comments," including that its 
agreement with the Town is "for the operation and maintenance of the system" and 
if the Town terminates the agreement, "Alligator [Water] will no longer be 
obligated to supply potable water to the Town." On June 13, 2011, DHEC Staff 
approved the Town's PER. On June 14, 2011, DHEC Staff issued a public water 
operating permit to the Town. On January 10, 2012, the Town submitted an 
application to DHEC to modify Well No. 2.  On November 13, 2012, DHEC 
issued the Town a permit for modifications to Well No. 2. 
According to Campolong, in the summer of 2013, the Town received a letter from 
Alligator Water that it was increasing the water wholesale rate by 56%. 
In a letter dated October 10, 2013, the Town informed A.O. Smith "the Town . . . 
has over the period of [three] years embarked on an evaluation of the existing 
water supply system currently owned by the Town . . . , as well as other sources of 
water for the Town's customers.  These facilities were in operation until just a 
couple of years ago." The letter further provided: 
Throughout the review process and the permitting 
required to place the existing water supply system back 
into operation, the Town . . . has worked closely with . . . 
DHEC. [DHEC has] been aware of the study that was 
performed on the water system and our efforts to provide 
a safe, reliable water source for our customers.  We have 
received all of the necessary permits for the new 
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construction and modifications to the existing wells and 
are working together on a daily basis with . . . DHEC in 
moving forward to place the system back into operation.  
The water supply system will meet all of the 
requirements of . . . DHEC from a water quality and 
redundancy standpoint. 
On October 16, 2013, the Town increased the rate it charged customers by 25%. 
The Town informed Alligator Water it would not pay the increased wholesale rate 
to Alligator Water until Alligator Water supplied it with certain financial data. 
On December 20, 2013, the Town submitted an application to DHEC for the 
construction of two granulated activated carbon contactors and associated 
appurtenances to be connected to Well No. 1 and Well No. 2.  On June 30, 2014, 
DHEC issued the Town a permit for the construction of the contactors for Well No. 
1 and Well No. 2.   
In 2014, according to Barron, A.O. Smith upgraded its fire protection system and 
began discussing water service with Alligator Water because A.O. Smith's 
engineer determined "the Town's water storage capacity was not sufficient to 
support the upgraded system."  In May 2015, Alligator Water began construction 
of a water line to connect to the A.O. Smith facility. 
In a meeting on September 3, 2015, A.O. Smith raised concerns to the Town about 
fire protection and future water supply.  According to the Town's engineer, this 
was the first time A.O. Smith raised those concerns to the Town.  A.O. Smith also 
raised concerns about the Town's ability to meet the facility's fire flow 
requirements with its two wells as well as other concerns about contaminants in the 
water. 
On January 12, 2016, after receiving a letter of certification from Joseph 
McGougan, P.E, DHEC issued the Town two Final Approvals to Place into 
Operation (Final Approvals)—one in accordance with the 2012 permit and the 
other in accordance with the 2014 permit. Both Final Approvals stated under the 
heading "SPECIAL CONDITIONS," "This Final Approval to Operate is being 
conditionally approved. The Department has concerns about the water system's 
capacity if only Well No. 1 and Well No. 2 are the sole sources for water supply."  
The Final Approvals also stated, "The Department recommends that the Town . . . 
15 
investigate this capacity issue to demonstrate that sufficient capacity exists before 
utilizing Well No.[ ]1 and Well No. 2 as the primary supply for water." 
On January 27, 2016, A.O. Smith requested a final review by the DHEC Board of 
the Final Approvals. On February 17, 2016, DHEC sent a letter to A.O. Smith's 
counsel regarding the Final Approvals, stating "[t]he [DHEC Board] will not 
conduct a Final Review Conference on the above-referenced matter." The letter 
further provided the following contested case guidance: 
Section 44-1-60 provides that if the Board declines in 
writing to schedule a final review conference, the staff 
decision becomes the final agency decision, and an 
applicant, permittee, licensee, or affected person may 
request a contested case hearing before the [ALC] within 
thirty calendar days after notice is mailed to the 
applicant, permittee, licensee, and affected person that 
the Board declined to hold a final review conference. 
On March 15, 2016, A.O. Smith filed with the ALC a request for a contested case 
hearing for review of the Final Approvals. The Town filed a motion to dismiss, 
arguing the ALC lacked jurisdiction because the request was untimely as DHEC 
issued the permits in question in 2011, 2012, and 2014 and A.O. Smith made no 
request for final review of those permits.2 
The ALC conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss3 on April 28, 2016. The 
ALC asked A.O. Smith if it "knew the construction was ongoing, why did [it] wait 
until it was completed?"  A.O. Smith responded it did not "believe [it] had 
sufficient information on whether or not these two wells [could] supply th[e] 
adequate capacity until they were completed and [it had] seen the records."  
According to an affidavit sworn by Barron on April 5, 2016, the Town's water 
service to A.O. Smith had in recent months become "interrupted and inadequate." 
2 The Town also filed a motion for relief from stay, asserting A.O. Smith's filing of 
the request for a contested case hearing arguably automatically stayed operation of 
the Final Approvals. A.O. Smith filed a response in opposition to the motion. 
3 The hearing also concerned the motion for relief from the stay. 
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On May 5, 2016, the ALC granted the motion to dismiss.  Following a motion for 
reconsideration filed by the A.O. Smith, the ALC vacated the order.  Thereafter, 
the ALC issued a new order granting the motion to dismiss.4 The ALC found A.O. 
Smith did not 
submit comments voicing concerns about the [2012 and 
2014] permits nor did [A.O. Smith] file requests for final 
review, therefore the staff decisions were final fifteen 
days after they were mailed.  [A.O. Smith] notes [DHEC] 
was not obligated by the regulations to issue any public 
notice for the construction permits at issue, implying that 
because of this, [A.O. Smith]'s failure to comment on the 
construction permits should not preclude its challenge of 
the final approvals. While the court recognizes that 
public notice was not required for the permits, [A.O. 
Smith] had notice and the opportunity to make comments 
or request notification as an affected person pursuant to 
section 44-l-60(E) [of the South Carolina Code] and to 
challenge those decisions to the Board.  To allow [A.O. 
Smith]'s untimely challenge would not only conflict with 
the plain language of the statute, but would also defeat 
the public policy purpose of finality through resolution of 
conflicts regarding construction projects while in the 
initial stages, and not after substantial investments and 
construction has already taken place. 
(footnote omitted).  The ALC noted A.O. Smith "had actual knowledge of [the 
Town]'s plans to operate its own water supply system, at the latest, on October 10, 
2013[,] when [the Town] sent a letter to [A.O. Smith], detailing its plans and 
encouraging comments or questions."  The ALC also disagreed with A.O. Smith's 
contention that because DHEC included "special conditions" in the Final 
Approvals, they were initial decisions.  The ALC found, "The special conditions 
simply reiterate the requirements of the State Primary Drinking Water regulations, 
and the vast majority of the special conditions in the [F]inal [A]pprovals are the 
4 The ALC noted because its decision to dismiss the contested case rendered the 
Town's motion for relief from stay moot, it would not address that motion. 
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same special conditions included in the Public Water System Operating Permit 
issued in June of 2011."  This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"The ALC presides over all hearings of contested DHEC permitting cases and, in 
such cases, serves as the fact-finder and is not restricted by the findings of the 
administrative agency."  Bailey v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 388 S.C. 
1, 4, 693 S.E.2d 426, 428 (Ct. App. 2010).  "[T]he ALC is authorized to make a 
final determination—after a final agency decision and subject to judicial review— 
as to whether an administrative agency should have granted or denied a particular 
permit."  Engaging & Guarding Laurens Cty.'s Env't (EAGLE) v. S.C. Dep't of 
Health & Envtl. Control, 407 S.C. 334, 344, 755 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2014).  When 
reviewing a decision of the ALC in such cases, this court's standard of review is 
governed by section 1-23-610 of the South Carolina Code.  Bailey, 388 S.C. at 4-5, 
693 S.E.2d at 428. The relevant portion of section 1-23-610 provides: 
The review of the [ALC]'s order must be confined to the 
record. The court may not substitute its judgment for the 
judgment of the [ALC] as to the weight of the evidence 
on questions of fact. The court of appeals may affirm the 
decision or remand the case for further proceedings; or, it 
may reverse or modify the decision if the substantive 
rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the 
finding, conclusion, or decision is: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) affected by other error of law; 
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, 
and substantial evidence on the whole record; or 
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(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of 
discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2018). 
"A reviewing court may reverse or modify an administrative decision if the 
findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence."  Risher v. S.C. Dep't of 
Health & Envtl. Control, 393 S.C. 198, 210, 712 S.E.2d 428, 434 (2011).  "When 
the evidence conflicts on an issue, the court's substantial evidence standard of 
review defers to the findings of the fact-finder."  Be Mi, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of 
Revenue, 408 S.C. 290, 297, 758 S.E.2d 737, 740 (Ct. App. 2014).  "In 
determining whether the ALC's decision was supported by substantial evidence, 
this court need only find that, upon looking at the entire record on appeal, there is 
evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion that 
the ALC reached." Engaging & Guarding Laurens Cty.'s Env't (EAGLE), 407 S.C. 
at 342, 755 S.E.2d at 448. "[W]e may not substitute our judgment for that of the 
[ALC] as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact unless the [ALC's] 
findings are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial 
evidence in the whole record."  Bailey, 388 S.C. at 5, 693 S.E.2d at 429 (alterations 
by court) (quoting Comm'rs of Pub. Works v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. 
Control, 372 S.C. 351, 358, 641 S.E.2d 763, 766-67 (Ct. App. 2007)). 
"Substantial evidence is 'evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would 
allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency 
reached.'"  Se. Res. Recovery, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 358 
S.C. 402, 407, 595 S.E.2d 468, 470 (2004) (quoting Lark v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 
135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981)). "Substantial evidence . . . is more than a mere 
scintilla of evidence." Original Blue Ribbon Taxi Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Motor 
Vehicles, 380 S.C. 600, 605, 670 S.E.2d 674, 676 (Ct. App. 2008).  "Substantial 
evidence is not . . . the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is 
evidence that, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to 
reach the conclusion the [ALC] reached in order to justify its action."  Fragosa v. 
Kade Constr., LLC, 407 S.C. 424, 428, 755 S.E.2d 462, 465 (Ct. App. 2013) 
(quoting Taylor v. S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 368 S.C. 33, 36, 627 S.E.2d 751, 




A.O. Smith argues the ALC erred in finding the Final Approvals are not staff 
decisions subject to appeal under section 44-1-60 of the South Carolina Code 
(2018 & Supp. 2018) because DHEC had a legal duty to issue the Final Approvals.  
It asserts the ALC was incorrect to narrowly interpret "initial decisions" to not 
include the Final Approvals because it is contrary to section 44-1-60 and the 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) definitions of DHEC decisions subject to a 
contested case. It maintains section 44-1-60(A) includes licenses and sections 
1-23-310(4) and -505(4) of the South Carolina Code (2005 & Supp. 2018) define 
license as a "similar form of permission required by law," which it asserts the Final 
Approvals unquestionably are.  We disagree. 
"The General Assembly has the authority to limit the subject matter jurisdiction of 
a court it has created; therefore, it can prescribe the parameters of the ALC's 
powers." Amisub of S.C., Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 403 S.C. 
576, 585, 743 S.E.2d 786, 791 (2013).  "By statute, the General Assembly has 
authorized the ALC to preside over 'contested case' proceedings."  Id. (noting 
section 44-1-60(F)(2) "allows applicants, permittees, licensees, or affected persons 
to file a request for a contested case hearing with the ALC in accordance with the 
APA after receiving a written decision from DHEC"). "[I]n environmental 
permitting cases, the AL[C] presides as the finder of fact."  Brown v. S.C. Dep't of 
Health & Envtl. Control, 348 S.C. 507, 520, 560 S.E.2d 410, 417 (2002). 
"Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which this [c]ourt is 
free to decide without any deference to the tribunal below."  Duke Energy Corp. v. 
S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 415 S.C. 351, 355, 782 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2016).  "The 
cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention 
of the legislature." Centex Int'l, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 406 S.C. 132, 139, 
750 S.E.2d 65, 69 (2013) (quoting Sloan v. Hardee, 371 S.C. 495, 498, 640 S.E.2d 
457, 459 (2007)). "A statutory provision should be given a reasonable and 
practical construction consistent with the purpose and policy expressed in the 
statute." Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 293 S.C. 447, 449, 
361 S.E.2d 346, 347 (Ct. App. 1987).  "[W]e must follow the plain and 
unambiguous language in a statute and have 'no right to impose another meaning.'" 
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Grier v. AMISUB of S.C., Inc., 397 S.C. 532, 535-36, 725 S.E.2d 693, 695 (2012) 
(quoting Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000)).   
Whe[n] the terms of the statute are clear, the court must 
apply those terms according to their literal meaning.  An 
appellate court cannot construe a statute without regard 
to its plain meaning and may not resort to a forced 
interpretation in an attempt to expand or limit the scope 
of a statute. 
Brown, 348 S.C. at 515, 560 S.E.2d at 414 (citation omitted). 
"'[W]ords in a statute must be construed in context,' and 'the meaning of particular 
terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with them in 
the statute.'" Eagle Container Co. v. Cty. of Newberry, 379 S.C. 564, 570, 666 
S.E.2d 892, 895-96 (2008) (alteration by court) (quoting S. Mut. Church Ins. Co. v. 
S.C. Windstorm & Hail Underwriting Ass'n, 306 S.C. 339, 342, 412 S.E.2d 377, 
379 (1991)). "The language must also be read in a sense [that] harmonizes with its 
subject matter and accords with its general purpose."  Id. at 570, 666 S.E.2d at 896 
(quoting Hitachi Data Sys. Corp. v. Leatherman, 309 S.C. 174, 178, 420 S.E.2d 
843, 846 (1992)). "[T]he statute must be read as a whole and sections [that] are 
part of the same general statutory law must be construed together and each one 
given effect." CFRE, LLC v. Greenville Cty. Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 74, 716 S.E.2d 
877, 881 (2011) (quoting S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Jasper Cty., 368 S.C. 388, 398, 
629 S.E.2d 624, 629 (2006)). 
"The construction of a statute by the agency charged with its administration will be 
accorded the most respectful consideration and will not be overruled absent 
compelling reasons."  Brown, 348 S.C. at 515, 560 S.E.2d at 414 (brackets 
omitted) (quoting Dunton v. S.C. Bd. of Exam'rs in Optometry, 291 S.C. 221, 223, 
353 S.E.2d 132, 133 (1987)). "While the [c]ourt typically defers to the Board's 
construction of its own regulation, whe[n] . . . the plain language of the regulation 
is contrary to the Board's interpretation, the [c]ourt will reject its interpretation."  
Id. at 515, 560 S.E.2d at 415. Section 44-1-60 provides: 
(A) All department decisions involving the issuance, 
denial, renewal, suspension, or revocation of permits, 
licenses, or other actions of the department which may 
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give rise to a contested case . . . must be made using the 
procedures set forth in this section. . . . 
. . . . 
(C) The initial decision involving the issuance, denial, 
renewal, suspension, or revocation of permits, licenses, 
or other action of the department shall be a staff decision. 
"In relevant part, [section] 44-1-60(E) provides that '[n]otice of the department 
decision must be sent to the applicant, permittee, licensee, and affected persons 
who have asked to be notified by certified mail, return receipt requested.'"  S.C. 
Coastal Conservation League v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 390 S.C. 
418, 427, 702 S.E.2d 246, 251 (2010) (last alteration by court).   
Section 44-1-60(E) sets forth the procedure for appealing 
from a staff decision and provides which parties DHEC is 
required to notify by certified mail of the decision. . . .  
[Section] 44-1-60(E) places an affirmative duty on 
DHEC to send simultaneous notification of appealable 
staff decisions to the applicant, permittee, licensee, and 
affected persons who have asked to be notified by 
certified mail . . . . 
Id. at 430, 702 S.E.2d at 253. 
"'Contested case' means a proceeding including, but not restricted to, ratemaking, 
price fixing, and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party 
are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing 
. . . ." § 1-23-310(3).  "'License' includes the whole or part of any agency permit, 
franchise, certificate, approval, registration, charter, or similar form of permission 
required by law, but it does not include a license required solely for revenue 
purposes . . . ." § 1-23-310(4). 
DHEC has promulgated the State Primary Drinking Water Regulations5 pursuant to 
sections 44-55-10 to -120 of the South Carolina Code (2018) "to maintain 
5 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-58 to 61-58.17 (2011 & Supp. 2018). 
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reasonable standards of purity of the drinking water of the State consistent with the 
public health, safety, and welfare of its citizens."  S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-58(A).  
The portion of those regulations regarding "Construction and Operation Permits" 
specifies the procedure for the "Request for Review of Permit Decisions": 
1. An applicant may request that the director of 
[DHEC]'s water supply permitting division review any 
construction or operating permit decision within 15 
(fifteen) days of receipt of the decision.  The request shall 
be in writing and include a detailed justification of the 
reasons for the review. 
2. The director shall respond in writing to the request 
within 15 (fifteen) days of receipt of the written request.  
This response may include, but not be limited to, a 
request for additional information, scheduling of a 
meeting to discuss the permit decision, or the issuance of 
a final permit decision. 
3. The applicant may appeal the director's final decision 
on the permit in accordance with [Regulation 61-58(C) of 
the South Carolina Code]. 
S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-58.1(N) (emphases added). 
A.O. Smith has consistently noted "[t]he Primary Drinking Water Regulations do 
not require public notice for a water supply construction permit."  The ALC found 
A.O. Smith implied because no notice was required for the permits, it should be 
able to challenge the Final Approvals.  The ALC determined, "While the court 
recognizes that public notice was not required for the permits, [A.O. Smith] had 
notice and the opportunity to make comments or request notification as an affected 
person pursuant to section 44-l-60(E) and to challenge those decisions to the 
Board." We disagree with A.O. Smith's argument that because it is actually 
challenging the final approval and not the permits, its challenge is timely.  The 
statute specifically provides contested cases are for initial decisions.  For a Final 
Approval to be an initial decision would be contrary to the ordinary meaning of the 
words. Because A.O. Smith did not file a request for a contested case hearing after 
the issuance of the permits in the time required, the ALC did not err in finding 
A.O. Smith's motion for a contested hearing untimely.  
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II. Conditional Approvals 
A.O. Smith asserts the ALC erred because even if Final Approvals are generally 
not staff decisions subject to appeal under section 44-1-60, the applicable 
regulation—Regulation 61-58.1(K) of the South Carolina Code—does not provide 
for conditional approvals, in contrast to other DHEC regulations that do, and that 
makes the Final Approvals here subject to appeal.  We disagree. 
"Interpreting and applying statutes and regulations administered by an agency is a 
two-step process. First, a court must determine whether the language of a statute 
or regulation directly speaks to the issue.  If so, the court must utilize the clear 
meaning of the statute or regulation." Kiawah Dev. Partners, II v. S.C. Dep't of 
Health & Envtl. Control, 411 S.C. 16, 32, 766 S.E.2d 707, 717 (2014).  "If the 
statute or regulation 'is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,' the 
court then must give deference to the agency's interpretation of the statute or 
regulation, assuming the interpretation is worthy of deference."  Id. at 33, 766 
S.E.2d at 717 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). 
In the State Primary Drinking Water Regulations, one subsection in the 
"Construction and Operation Permits" section, entitled "Requirements for 
Construction Permits," provides, "Before the construction, expansion[,] or 
modification of any public water system, application for a permit to construct shall 
be made to, and a permit to construct obtained from, [DHEC]."  S.C. Code Ann. 
Regs. 61-58.1(B)(1) (emphasis added).  However, another part of that subsection 
specifies, "Before a permit to construct can be issued for a new public water 
system, the applicant shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of [DHEC] that the new 
system will be a 'viable water system' as defined in [Regulation 61-58(B) of the 
South Carolina Code]." S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-58.1(B)(4) (emphases added). 
Another subsection of that regulation, entitled "Requirements for Obtaining 
Approval to Place Permitted Construction into Operation," states: 
Newly-constructed facilities shall not be placed into 
operation until written approval is issued by [DHEC], 
except where it is allowed by a general construction 
permit.  Upon completion of permitted construction, the 
professional engineer shall make arrangements with 
24 
[DHEC] for final inspection.  Prior to this inspection, the 
professional engineer shall submit to [DHEC] a letter 
certifying that construction is complete and in accordance 
with the approved plans and specifications. 
S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-58.1(K)(1) (emphasis added). 
One part of the section entitled "Groundwater Sources and Treatment" provides: 
This regulation applies to all new construction and all 
expansions or modifications of existing public water 
systems. If [DHEC] can reasonably demonstrate that safe 
delivery of potable water to the public is jeopardized, a 
system may have to upgrade its existing facilities in order 
for an expansion or modification to meet the 
requirements of this regulation.  This regulation 
prescribes minimum design standards for the 
construction of groundwater sources and treatment 
facilities. 
S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-58.2(A) (emphases added). 
That section also provides: 
The total developed groundwater source capacity shall 
equal or exceed the design maximum day demand 
without pumping more than sixteen (16) hours a day.  
With the largest producing well out of service, the 
capacity of the remaining well(s) pumping twenty-four 
(24) hours a day shall equal or exceed the design 
maximum daily demand, except those systems requiring 
only one well. The capacity from an additional source 
(Surface Water Plant or Master Meter) will be included 
in the quantity analysis.  However, emergency and 
stand[]by wells will not be included in the quantity 
analysis. 
S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-58.2(B)(1)(b). 
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Additionally, the portion of the regulations concerning operation and maintenance 
for all public water systems specifies: 
The capacity of a public water system which uses 
groundwater as its only drinking water source, shall be 
based on all operable wells pumping 16 hours a day or all 
operable wells minus the largest well pumping 24 hours a 
day, which[]ever is less.  If the system has an additional 
source (surface water plant or metered connection from 
another public water system), the additional capacity 
from that source shall be used in determining the total 
capacity of the system. If the capacity of the system is 
exceeded on a consistent basis during the peak water use 
months, the system shall submit a preliminary 
engineering report to [DHEC] within ninety (90) days 
addressing in detail any upgrade necessary to keep up 
with any growth in demand on the system.  Construction 
plans and specifications for a new well may be submitted 
in lieu of the preliminary engineering report.  In addition, 
[DHEC] may elect not to issue any construction permits 
for new water line construction until the capacity of the 
system is increased. 
S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-58.7(D)(12) (emphasis added). 
As DHEC points out, Regulation 61-58.1(K) does not address whether a Final 
Approval can include conditions. DHEC asserts it interprets this as allowing 
conditional approvals. Because DHEC is the agency charged with this regulation, 
we defer to its interpretation.  See Kiawah Dev. Partners, II, 411 S.C. at 33, 766 
S.E.2d at 717 ("If the statute or regulation 'is silent or ambiguous with respect to 
the specific issue,' the court then must give deference to the agency's interpretation 
of the statute or regulation, assuming the interpretation is worthy of deference." 
(quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843)). Further, if DHEC determines 
the Town is not complying with the Safe Drinking Water Act, DHEC can pursue 
an enforcement action. See Amisub of S.C., Inc., 403 S.C. at 595, 743 S.E.2d at 
796-97 (finding "[i]f DHEC had determined that [a company] was in violation of 
any applicable provision, it was entitled to pursue an enforcement action.  DHEC, 
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however, never found that [the company or its parent company] was in violation of 
any procedures."). Because DHEC was simply restating the applicable regulation 
and because the regulation is silent, the conditions in the Final Approvals did not 
render it an initial decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Because A.O. Smith did not timely challenge the permits and the conditions in the 
Final Approvals did not make them initial decisions, the ALC's dismissal of A.O. 
Smith's request for a contested case is 
AFFIRMED. 
HUFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur. 
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